How and why the military upholds democracy in Malawi and Zambia
“Much of the literature on African politics under the era of multiparty rule emphasises the subversive role of the military or elements of it on democracy. A persistent limitation of this scholarship is the focus on places where coups happen. But what about countries where coups do not happen, and where democracy has been upheld since the return to multiparty politics in the early 1990s? How does the army behave and why does it behave this way? I hope this project will provide a much-needed corrective to the existing literature,’ said Iso Lomso fellow Sishuwa Sishuwa of the History Department at Stellenbosch University.
“Preliminary evidence suggests that contrary to studies that only highlight its adversarial role, consensus, the military has, in some cases, helped secure democratic gains by intervening in politics through non-intervention at critical junctures,” he added.
Sishuwa emphasised that, although plentiful, the literature on democracy in Africa, within which the military’s role in politics should be understood, is broadly divided into two strands and he hopes his project leads to some rethinking.
The first strand is around democratic consolidation in the 1990s and early 2000s with an emphasis on the role of civil society, formal political institutions (such as political parties, electoral management bodies and independent media) and international actors.
He explained that in this period, Western governments poured resources into civil-society organisations to enhance accountability. The civil society that emerged was of a neoliberal character, urban based and often constituted by educated elites who had either failed to secure employment in the civil services or were looking for careers beyond it. There was an emphasis on consolidating to sustain democracy. Independent media also emerged in this context to help expose corruption and hold the ruling elites to account.
“A critical free press and strong civil society were important to international donors,’ he said, “creating a narrative that democracy was thriving or consolidating.”
The second strand focuses on democratic backsliding since the 2010s with an emphasis on the return to authoritarianism and deployment of lawfare to undermine democracy.
“Both strands are problematic – the first turned out to premature in its emphasis on consolidation while the notion of backsliding implies a certain teleology of forward progression and anything else must be backsliding. The latter has hardly been the case in much of Africa. Perhaps with the exception of Botswana, Ghana, and Mauritius, there was never a golden age of democracy in most African countries when the ideal standard was reached. Backsliding represents tendencies that have always been present but that become more or less visible at certain junctures – depending on the leader’s personality and his or her chosen coalition.”
“Zimbabwe, for example, was never truly democratic at any stage since the 1990s for us to say it is backsliding. The general willingness by former liberation movements such as the governing Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front to adhere to democratic norms in earlier decades arose from the understanding that democracy was not an impediment to retaining power.” he said. “Many of the institutions of authoritarianism remained intact and were not dismantled. So rather than taking the turn to democratic backsliding as a new direction, it is more helpful to consider authoritarianism as a development that has merely resumed after a short break”.
He also pointed out that the rise of China and Russia in this later period is also important. “These two powers have provided resources and an alternative development model that is not linked to the promotion of democracy and human rights.”
Blindspot
But he believes a blind spot in the scholarship has been the political role of the military. “There is a lot of historical work on the interaction between the military and politics in Africa but mainly before the 1990s when coups were a common occurrence,” he explained. “Scholarly neglect of the army’s role in sustaining democracies is a result of the decline of formal military rule, an unwillingness to look beyond formal political institutions and processes, and the emphasis on civil society as the ‘good guys’. The military has not been taken seriously as a political actor in Africa.”
“Where it has been, the focus is on the military’s negative role – a focus that has been helped in part by a return to military rule in parts of West Africa like Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso,” he added.
“A strong case can be made for the military’s role in politics in the multiparty era in countries where coups did not happen or have hardly happened. How does army behave towards democracy in such contexts and why? My project seeks to answer this question using two case studies – Malawi and Zambia − to highlight the important, sometimes unorthodox, role of the military in sustaining and promoting democracy or democratic gains in Africa.”
“I argue that despite the reverse trend in parts of West Africa over the past couple of years, the army continues to be a positive force in the process of democratisation elsewhere, contrary to academic studies that only stress the institution’s largely adversarial role.”
“It is not common to think of soldiers in a positive sense when it comes to democracy promotion,” he added. “Many African countries have been generally peaceful in the last 30 years and the army has played an important but largely unrecognised role, at least in the scholarship, in securing this outcome.”
Why Zambia and Malawi?
Sishuwa explained that Zambia and Malawi have a shared British colonial history, achieved independence in 1964, and returned from one-party states to multiparty democracy in the early 1990s. Both are also still dependent on Britain for military training and constitutional design. “Although there has been no military rule since the reintroduction of multiparty democracy in both countries, the military has gained considerable stature as political actors.”
He also noted that both countries have experienced at least two transfers of power since the founding transition elections in the early 1990s had and have remained peaceful in a region that has experienced constant conflict. “In both countries, there have been key interventions where the military has refused to subvert the rule of law and the constitution.”
Sishuwa is focusing on the political role of soldiers in three broad political developments: the transition from one-party rule to liberal democracy in the early 1990s; the protection of presidential term limits in the early 2000s; and leadership succession and peaceful transfers of power in the 2010s and early 2020s.
Highlighting some specifics, he explained that the behaviour of the army or elements of it played key roles in persuading both Kenneth Kaunda, Zambia’s from 1964 to 1991, and Hastings Banda, the- President of Malawi from 1964 to 1994, to pave the way for multiparty democracy. “Both Kaunda and Banda were widely seen as authoritarian leaders who held a firm grip on or tightly controlled state institutions, including the military. Yet in both cases, the rank and file of the army supported the transition because they believed a change of government would benefit their economic interests.”
When the second President of Zambia, Frederick Chiluba, tried to amend the constitution in 2001 to run for a third term, “agitation in the rank and file of the military increased the risk of a coup against him. It was this threat of military intervention that proved decisive in forcing President Chiluba to abandon the third term and step down.”
Similarly, the risk of military intervention proved decisive in forcing Malawian President Bakili Muluzi to abandon his bid to change the constitution in order to seek a third term in office. Like Chiluba, Muluzi was forced to anoint a successor and reluctantly stepped down in 2004. Sishuwa argued that this “intervention through non-intervention” approach by the army helped to protect presidential term limits in these fragile democracies, yet the existing literature on both cases only emphasises the role of internal party opposition and the opposition from civil society in the dramatic collapse of the third term bids.
When Malawian President Bingu wa Mutharika died in office in 2012, Vice-President Joyce Banda, elected as Mutharika’s running mate in the preceding general election, was required to assume the presidency by operation of the constitution. However, a faction within the governing party attempted to subvert the constitutional order, and its manoeuvres prompted the army to immediately intervene through non-intervention and ensure a smooth succession. During the 2021 general election in Zambia, the army was asked to intervene in support of one political faction, but it declined. This paved the way for the peaceful transfer of power following the defeat of the incumbent president and the victory of the main opposition party.
Variables that Sishuwa will unpack in more detail include the role of macroeconomic factors in informing the behaviour of the army in these three developments. Another variable is the nationalist struggle history of the two countries. “Unlike Zimbabwe or South Africa, neither had liberation armies,” he said, “so there were no concerns about how to integrate these into official army structures after the achievement of independence.”
In both countries, the military have shown that if they feel mistreated by the civilian authorities, their response is to use the ballot to express their grievances, not the gun. “There appears to be a general commitment by the rank and file to democracy, which is embraced as the political system that guarantees a change of leadership without violence. Soldiers are also voters, and they take this role very seriously. In other words, soldiers in both Malawi and Zambia gun for democracy through the ballot.”
“Coups are also more likely to regularly happen where they have previously occurred and been successful. Malawi has never experienced a coup while Zambia has had four attempted military seizure of power, including one under the era of multiparty democracy, but none of them were successful,” he added. “There is, in both countries, a distinct political culture, muscle memory, and military history that shape future behaviour.”
In discussion, Sishuwa spoke about the challenges of gaining access to military personnel for interviews. “Generally speaking, my sources for this project are mainly drawn from interviews conducted with military actors including ordinary soldiers, security officials, political elites, etc, archival materials and newspaper reports. These interviewees were identified from contemporary reports of the three political developments I focus on and accessed through my existing contacts as a long-standing Zambian political commentator and historian who has conducted research in Zambia for over a decade. My professional status as an academic also smoothed my connections and interactions with informants in Malawi, several of whom are members of the country’s political and military elite. The military is a ‘black box’ or highly secretive institution where gaining access to sources is especially hard. However, soldiers are human and willing to share their views once they trust a researcher. So, one must build trust. There is no tick box – referrals, trust, and connections are needed − then the complete story emerges,” he said.
The project, once completed, will culminate into a single-authored monograph to be published in due course.
Michelle Galloway: Part-time media officer at STIAS
Photograph: SCPS Photography